Board and saved-view endpoints now properly restrict access to boards you’re a member of. Commenters and thread responders may wish to revisit existing board-visibility references to ensure board-scoped behavior is clearly explained. (HTPR-7166)
What’s changed
- Saved-view access gating – Requests to saved-view endpoints now check board membership before returning or mutating data. Users not on the board see
404 Not Foundwhen trying to fetch, rename, delete, or switch to such views. - Cross-board data leakage closed – Column names, settings, and pages from other boards are no longer visible through CLI (
view show / board,--tasks), MCP tools saved-view reads, or board/chat API calls.
How it works
When a request specifies a saved view, the backend loads that view’s view_query payload and resolves which board owns it. If the signed-in session belongs to that board, endpoints proceed; otherwise they return 404 Not Found rather than leaking partial board metadata or performing side effects. This prevents users from borrowing an invite or leveraging saved-view references to reach boards they do not share.
Why this matters
- Stronger security boundaries – Invites and saved views can no longer indirectly expose cross-board data.
- Consistent with access semantics – Saved-view behavior now matches board-readable resource behavior (tasks, tables, pages), which also enforce board-scoped access for anyone signed in.
Related tickets
- HTPR-7166 – Production verification after roll-forward on 2026-10-13.